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I. Introduction 
Since the Weimar Republic , protection against wrongful dismissals is one of the core elements of German labor
law. In its present form, its essential function – at least in theory – is to protect the employee against arbitrary
dismissals and hence to maintain existing employment relationships ( Bestandsschutz ): If a dismissal is 
wrongful, in principle the employee has the right to be reinstated to his or her former job. Contrary to other 
legal systems, the idea of a compensation for financial disadvantages caused by a dismissal is not prevailing in 
the German model. This concept of maintaining employment relationships against arbitrary dismissals even has 
constitutional character. According to the Federal Constitutional Court , a minimum of statutory dismissal 
protection is guaranteed by the German constitution . [1] As a result of the freedom of occupation [2] and the 
Welfare-State clause in Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, the federal legislature has the constitutional
obligation to establish a minimum of protection against dismissals; however, in fulfilling this constitutional task 
it has a wide discretionary power. 
In spite of its long existence, the legal system of dismissal protection is presently undergoing a fundamental
crisis. For several years, there has been a highly controversial debate in Germany on whether the existing level
of dismissal protection should be reduced. Due to the increasingly high unemployment rate in Germany , more
and more economists, labor lawyers, and politicians raised the question of whether or not the existing strict
dismissal protection has negative effects on unemployment. As this question is affirmed by a growing number
of people arguing that the German dismissal protection is too expensive for employers, particularly for small
and medium-sized enterprises and is therefore an obstacle to the creation of new jobs, a great number of
reform proposals are “on the market” in order to remedy these insinuated negative effects of dismissal
protection on the labor markets and to give incentives for the creation of new jobs.
The reform debate is embedded in the existing legal context. We therefore first have to outline – after a brief
view on the historical background (Section II) – the key elements of the existing German model of protection
against dismissals with notice. The emphasis will be on the general regime of dismissal protection (Section III),
in particular on the concept of social justification as the core element of German dismissal protection. However,
the statutory dismissal protection for specific groups, such as disabled employees or pregnant women will be
touched briefly (Section IV). An analysis of the statutory dismissal protection would be incomplete if the
procedural mechanisms provided by the law were not taken into account: We therefore have to glance at the
forms of dispute resolution and their efficiency (Section V). The two final sections are reserved to the most
significant economic effects of the German dismissal protection (Section VI) and – as linked with the debate on
the economic effects – to the discussion of some of the most relevant reform proposals (Section VII).
II. Historical Background 
 
The German system of dismissal protection has undergone a fundamental change since its beginnings in the 
Weimar Republic (1918-1933). Only a few historical remarks will suffice to show how the statutory dismissal 
protection has changed from a rather compensation-oriented model to a system aimed at the job protection of 
the dismissed employee. 
Leaving aside some specific rules in the context of the demobilization after the end of World War I, the 
protection against unfair dismissal was essentially regulated in section 84 of the Works Councils Act of 1920.
[3] According to this provision, dismissed employees could have recourse to the works council within a period 
of five days if the dismissal: (1) had a discriminatory character, (2) was not motivated, (3) was the result of 
the employee's refusal to accept work other than that agreed upon in the employment contract, or (4) if the 
dismissal had to be considered as inequitable and not justified by the employee's behavior or by the economic 
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situation of the establishment. In cases where the employee's appeal was grounded, the employer could freely 
demand the dissolution of the employment relationship for severances pay to the employee. [4] Another 
characteristic trait of this model was that the Works Council could sue the employer without the dismissed 
employee's consent. Consequently, the Works Council had a very strong position in the then existing system of 
dismissal protection. This collectivism was in accordance with the general theory underlying German labor law 
during the Weimar Republic . [5] 
During the era of National Socialism, these collective elements of dismissal protection were abolished. [6] 
However, there are also surprising continuities with the Weimar system of dismissal protection: According to
section 56 of the Act on the Order of National Labor of January 20, 1934, [7] in establishments with at least ten 
employees dismissals were illegal when they had to be considered as an undue hardship for the dismissed 
employee and when they were not caused by the economic situation of the establishment; in these cases the 
employee could sue the employer before the Labor Court and could demand from him the revocation of the 
dismissal. [8] In cases where the dismissal had to be considered wrongful, the Labor Court had to dissolve the
employment relationship on the – even non-motivated – demand of the employer. [9] Consequently, also 
during National Socialism, dismissal protection lead in most cases only to the payment of an indemnity for the 
job loss and did not require the maintenance of the employment relationship. [10] 
It was only shortly after the end of World War II, that most of the re-founded States ( Länder ) established the 
Acts on the Protection against Dismissal. [11] Some of them mainly reverted to the model of section 84 of the
Works Council Act of 1920, whereas others required a social justification of the dismissal. It was only in 1951, 
that the Federal Parliament enacted a federal Act on the Protection against Dismissal ( Kündigungsschutzgesetz
) and that the dispersion of legal regimes in the field of protection against wrongful dismissal could be 
overcome. It was based on a compromise between the umbrella organizations of the unions and the employers' 
associations in 1950. [12] Essentially, the new Act provided that dismissals in establishments with more than
five employees – apprentices not counted – required a social justification. Since then, the notion of social
justification is the essential criterion for the legality of dismissals; we will come back to this central notion of
dismissal protection later. [13] The Act on the Protection against Dismissal was revised in 1969 and received –
excepted the small business clause in section 23, paragraph 1 [14] – the form that is still valid today. [15] It 
does not provide collective elements in the dismissal procedure. These were established only one year later by 
the Works Constitution Act of October 11, 1952 : [16] According to its section 66, the works council only 
disposed of an information and consultation right with regard to dismissals; these participation rights have 
been affirmed by the reform of the Works Constitution Act in 1972. [17] 
In summary, two points merit mention regarding the historical development of dismissal protection in Germany 
. First, it has to be noticed, that the center of gravity of dismissal protection has shifted from a rather 
collectivistic understanding at its beginning to an essentially individualistic approach. And, second, it is 
important to note, that the statutory dismissal protection originally was rather conceived as a compensation 
system whereas today it aims at the maintenance of the job. 
III. General Regime of Dismissal Protection 
A. The Role of the Works Council 
Although we have stated that the German system has been developed into a system of dismissal protection in 
which the individual elements are prevailing, [18] the model would not become clear, if we did not take into 
consideration the important role that the works councils play in dismissal procedures. [19] The Works 
Constitution Act of 1972 establishes for the private sector an institutionalized system of workers participation 
by works councils. [20] In every establishment with more than five employees, a works council has to be 
elected by the entire workforce with the exception of the executive staff. According to the law, works councils 
are independent from trade unions and cannot be considered as unions' representatives on the establishment 
level such as shop stewards. [21] They dispose of various participation rights, such as rights to information,
consultation and co-determination. Among them, the most important are certainly those of co-determination,
because they entail matters that belong – in the absence of a works council – to the prerogative of
management. Moreover, these rights can be invoked by means of a ruling of the establishment-level arbitration
committee ( Einigungsstelle ) when a voluntary solution of the establishment dispute cannot be reached and
when the works council or the employer requests the arbitration. In particular, co-determination of works
councils covers participation in arrangements regarding so-called „social matters“ (e.g. working time schemes,
health, safety at work etc.), participation concerning certain personnel decisions (e.g. the elaboration of
guidelines for personnel selection) and concerning certain economic matters (such as the conclusion of a „social
compensation plan“ in case of a down-sizing or the closure of the establishment). It is important to note that
works councils are not entitled to go to strike in order to pursue the employees' interests. There is an absolute
peace obligation for them provided by section 74, paragraph 2 of the Works Constitution Act.
Regarding dismissals, the competence of the works councils is rather limited. They cannot prevent the 
employer from dismissing employees; the decision of the employer as to whether one or several employees 
shall be dismissed is not covered by the participation of the works council. Its role is limited to information and 
consultation. Before pronouncing a dismissal, the employer has to inform and to consult the works council on 
the dismissal project [22] . Nonetheless, the role played by it in the dismissal procedure should not be 
underestimated since the dismissal is void and cannot be healed by a later consultation of the works council if 
the employer does not respect the information and consultation procedure [23] . 
In the case of a dismissal with notice, the works council has to react within one week; in the case of a dismissal 
without notice, within three working days. There are three ways of reaction possible. First, the works council 
can declare its consent with the dismissal project. Second, the works council can react by saying nothing. In 
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this case, the law assumes its consent with the dismissal project after the consultation period has expired. And 
third, the works council can contradict the dismissal project. However, the law specifies only five reasons for a 
justified contradiction. [24] (1) The employer has not sufficiently taken into consideration social aspects, (2) 
the dismissal violates one of the agreed company guidelines on personnel policy, (3) the dismissed employee 
can be transferred within the establishment or to another establishment of the employer, (4) a re-training that 
the employer reasonably can be expected to provide is possible, or (5) a continuation of the employment 
relationship with changed working conditions is possible. It is important to note that an objection by the works 
council does not affect the validity of the dismissal at all. However, there is one important effect of a justified 
objection for the dismissed employee: He or she can demand reinstatement to his or her old position, according 
to the conditions of his or her employment contract, until the end of the procedure before the labor court. [25] 
Summing up the role of the works council in dismissal cases, we can say that its main task is to involve the 
employer in a communication process about the proposed dismissal and to rationalize dismissal decisions. 
There is some empirical evidence that employers respect the information and consultation of works councils in 
practice. [26] 
B. Statutory Notice Periods 
Another legal requirement for dismissals with notice is that the notice period is respected. Until 1994, the law 
distinguished between notice periods for blue-collar and white-collar workers and privileged the latter. Due to a 
decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of May 30, 1990, [27] the notice periods had to be assimilated, 
which has been done by the reform of section 622 Civil Code. There is now a notice period of one month to 
fifteenth day of that same month, or to the end of the month if the employment contract has been existing up 
to two years. It increases in correlation with the length of service. The longest notice period provided by the 
law is seven months if the employment contract has been existing twenty years or more. These statutory notice 
periods can be prolonged by employment contract. However, in principle, a reduction of them is not possible. 
[28] Only collective agreements can modify these statutory notice periods. [29] 
C. The Concept of Social Justification 
The core element of the statutory dismissal protection in Germany is, as we already have pointed out, the 
notion of social justification provided by section 1 of the Act on Protection against Dismissal. Only 
socially-justified dismissals are lawful. 
1. Applicability of the Act on Protection against Dismissal 
The statutory dismissal protection provided by the Act on Protection against Dismissal does not cover all 
employees. An employee is covered by the Act on Protection against Dismissal only if two conditions are 
fulfilled. First, the employment relationship has to exist for at least six months. [30] In employment 
relationships that exist for less than six months, the employer can dismiss without the restriction of the Act on 
Protection against Dismissal. Consequently, employees are normally on probation for six months. 
Much more important in practice is the so-called small business clause of section 23, paragraph 1 of the Act on
Protection against Dismissal. According to this provision, small establishments with ten or fewer employees, 
part-time employees only counting pro rata temporis, not including trainees, are not covered by the statutory 
dismissal protection. [31] Since the 1980s, this threshold is probably one of the most discussed provisions in 
the German legal system of dismissal protection. The adherents of section 23, paragraph 1 hold that the
threshold is necessary to protect small business establishments against high costs resulting from the protection 
against dismissal and that relief contributes to more job creation in small businesses. [32] The opponents of 
the small business clause, on the other side, reject the threshold since it would lead to an unjustified 
discrimination of employees in small business. Originally, section 23, paragraph 1 only excluded employment
relationships in establishments with five or fewer employees calculated per capita . In 1985, the German 
parliament adopted the Employment Promotion Act by which the pro rata temporis calculation has been 
established in section 23, paragraph 1. The Act on Employment Promotion of 1996, [33] voted under the 
liberal-conservative majority of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, raised the threshold from five to ten employees per 
establishment. In an important decision from 1998, the Federal Constitutional Court [34] considered this 
reform constitutional. The Court mainly argued that the specific situation and problems of small business justify 
an exemption of these establishments from the statutory protection against dismissal; the provision, therefore, 
does not violate the constitutional principle of equal treatment. [35] After the Social-democrats and Greens 
came into power in 1998, the reform of 1996 was abolished and again the threshold of section 23, paragraph 1
was reduced to five employees maintaining the pro rata temporis calculation. By this, the new majority fulfilled 
a campaign promise. However, due to the increasing political pressure on the Federal Government during the 
following years, in 2004 the Social-democratic/Green majority again raised the threshold from five to ten 
employees. [36] 
What are the consequences of the small business clause for employees working in establishments with ten or
fewer employees? Do they have no protection against unfair dismissal at all? Generally speaking, the employer
does not need a specific reason to dismiss one or several of its employees. However, the employers' freedom to
“fire” is limited by the general clauses of public policy [37] and of good faith. [38] According to the previously 
mentioned decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 1998, these general clauses of civil law have to be 
interpreted in light of the employees' constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of occupation. [39] The employer 
therefore has to respect a minimum of social protection when dismissing employees. The only example the 
Court gives is that the employee's confidence in the continuation of an employment relationship that already 
existed for a long period of time should be taken into consideration. [40] The Federal Labor Court has solidified 
this obligation of the employer in two recent decisions. [41] However, the precise extent of this 
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constitutionally-guaranteed minimum dismissal protection in small businesses still remains unclear. 
2. The Principle of proportionality 
One essential element of the concept of social justification that has to be taken into consideration for every 
dismissal under the Act on Protection against Dismissal is the principle of proportionality. [42] The social 
justification of a dismissal requires that it is proportional. 
This principle has several aspects. In particular, it implies that a dismissal under the Act on Protection against 
Dismissal is only lawful, if the termination of the employment contract by the employer is the ultima ratio . [43] 
The law solidifies this principle of last resort in several of its provisions. The employee only can be dismissed if 
he or she cannot be employed on another (comparable) workplace in the same establishment or in another 
establishment of the same company; [44] the same applies to dismissals if the employee can be transferred to 
another workplace with changed working conditions after a retraining for reasonable costs. [45] Moreover, the 
principle of last resort demands that the employer first declares a dismissal to change working conditions ( 
Änderungskündigung ) before terminating the employment contract by dismissal. [46] 
Furthermore, the principle of proportionality demands that all aspects of the case are taken into consideration 
and that the conflicting interests of the employee and those of the employer are balanced. On the one hand, 
this produces more justice in the particular case. On the other hand, however, it leads to an often deplored 
legal uncertainty. Since the outcome of the balancing of interests highly depends on the subjective views of the 
judge, it is often unclear for the parties whether an individual dismissal complies with the law or not. 
3. Types of social justification 
As mentioned above, the Act on Protection against Dismissal contains three different types of social 
justification. 
a. Reasons concerning the Employee's Personality 
A reason concerning the employee's personality justifying a dismissal presupposes that the employee is no 
longer able to fulfill his or her contractual obligation to work. By far the most important case in practice is 
probably long-term or repeated sicknesses of employees. 
Dismissals for sickness pose difficult problems since the employer has to pay the employee sick pay during a 
sickness for a maximum period of six weeks. [47] Up to this point, the employer has to bear the remuneration 
costs of sicknesses. It is obvious that this can lead to considerable financial burdens in particular for small and 
medium sized enterprises. This is the reason the Federal Labor Court allows dismissals for sickness under 
certain severe requirements, although sick employees, in demanding sick pay, have only exercised their 
statutory right. The courts examine the social justification of dismissals for sickness in three steps. [48] First,
there has to be a negative medical prognosis regarding the employee's sickness. As the doctor who is treating
the employee is obliged to professional secrecy, the employee eventually has to allow him or her to disclose the
necessary information on his or her health condition. Second, the permanent or repeated absence of the
employee has to cause an “unacceptable burden” to the employer. However, there are no fix numbers that
indicate when the financial burdens borne by the employer are unacceptable; the evaluation is on a
case-by-case basis. And finally, the dismissal for sickness must be result of a consideration of interests from a
reasonable employer's point of view. All aspects of the case must be taken into consideration and have to be
balanced by the judge.
b. Reasons Concerning the Employee's Behavior 
Reasons concerning the employee's behavior refer to breaches of his or her obligations resulting from the 
employment contract. The dismissal is a sanction for contract breaches from the employee's side. 
Major examples of dismissals for reasons concerning the employee's behavior are repeated unpunctuality of the 
employee; [49] committing criminal tort referring to the employment relationship, [50] such as insults of the 
employer or one of the members of his executive staff; [51] and sexual harassment of colleagues [52] Hence 
misbehavior of the employee can be sanctioned severely by the employer. 
The principle of last resort normally requires that, before pronouncing a dismissal, the employer has to warn 
the employee. Only if an admonition remains fruitless the employer can dismiss for reasons concerning the 
employee's behavior. However, a warning is not necessary in exceptional cases if it is obvious that the 
employee would not change his or her behavior or if the contract breach is of such an importance that a 
continuation of the employment relationship is no longer reasonable for the employer. [53] 
c. Economic Reasons 
The third, and by far the most discussed type of social justification are dismissals for economic reasons. [54] 
Those reasons can be internal (e.g. capacity reductions because of rationalization) or external (e.g. economic 
slowdown) to the employer. The entrepreneurial decision to reduce capacity, in particular the employer's 
considerations of expediency, are in principle not controlled by the Labor Courts. [55] Consequently, the 
employer has a discretionary power as far as the decision about the maintenance of the job or jobs in question 
is concerned. 
The principle of last resort requires that the employer examines whether the employee in question can be 
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transferred to another workplace in the same establishment or in another establishment of the employer. [56] 
It is not necessary that the employee has the skills for the alternative job, since the employer is obliged to train 
and retrain the employee for the new job to which he or she shall be transferred. However, this obligation is 
limited: a retraining only has to take place if the payment of the retraining costs can reasonably be expected by 
the employer. It is obvious that this obligation to transfer the employee can pose serious problems in big 
companies. In companies with thousands of employees (and with a large number of establishments), it is 
practically impossible to confirm with certainty that there is no adequate workplace to which the employee can 
be transferred. [57] 
Furthermore, the employer is obliged to carry out a so-called “social selection” ( Sozialauswahl ) before 
dismissing employees for economic reasons; if he does not respect the legal requirements the dismissal is 
socially not justified. [58] The general idea of this selection procedure is that employees who would be affected 
the most by a dismissal are protected more than those who easily can find a new job. The employer is obliged 
in selecting the employees who shall be dismissed to take sufficiently into consideration the employee's length 
of service, his or her age, his or her obligation to pay alimonies to family members and disabilities of the 
employee. This limitation of the social selection to four criteria results from the previously mentioned Act on 
Reforms on the Labor Market of 2003. Before, the employer had to take into consideration all relevant social 
aspects that are related to the employment relationship such as the chances of the dismissed employee on the 
labor market. [59] Of course, not only social criteria have to be taken into account in the selection decision. 
The employers' operational interests also must be considered. Those employees whose employment is in the 
legitimate interest of the employer are not included in the social selection. [60] This is particularly the case 
when an employee is needed for his skills, abilities and performances. The same applies to employees whose 
employment has to be continued when it is necessary to maintain a balanced age structure of staff: [61] Since
the length of service and the employee's age are social aspects that favor older employees, the maintenance of
a balanced age structure of staff permits the employer to avoid a “senescence” of his staff resulting from the
“social selection” procedure.
In practice, the “social selection” can pose serious problems for employers. The main reason is the legal
uncertainty it creates for the employer. Although the law enumerates all social aspects that have to be taken
into consideration by the employer, it remains unclear how they are to weigh. Section 1, paragraph 3 of the Act
on Protection against Dismissal leaves it open whether the length of service or the employee's age ranks higher
or lower than family burdens or disabilities. “Point-schemes” fixed by the employer and providing for each
social aspect (e.g., for every year of service) a certain amount of points are only accepted as an instrument of
“pre-selection”; they do not substitute the individual act of balancing. [62] However, the employer can get legal 
certainty as to the balancing of the social aspects if a collective agreement or a works agreement [63] defines 
criteria how the different aspects have to be weight. [64] These collective contracts can only be controlled by
the Labor Courts whether or not they contain serious violations of section 1, paragraph 3 of the Act on
Protection against Dismissal. Despite this considerable legal advantage, there are only a few collective
agreements or works agreements on “social selection” criteria. The reason for this retention might be that
neither unions nor works councils want to de-legitimize themselves vis-à-vis the represented employees with
such agreements. Another problem is building up groups of relevant employees who have to be included into
the “social selection”. Finally, the “social selection” can be attacked by every dismissed employee. In the case
of collective dismissals, for instance, this can considerably increase the risks for the employer since it can
happen that different chambers within the Labor Court have to deal with the “social selection” procedure and
that they come to different results.
4. Reinstatement until the End of the Labor Court Procedure 
As previously mentioned, the Act on Protection against Dismissal aims at protecting the existing employment 
relationship vis-à-vis arbitrary dismissals by the employer. Consequently, the employee who has been
dismissed without social justification is entitled to be reinstated on his or her former job according to the 
working conditions agreed upon in the employment contract. The German law even goes further. Although it is 
unclear during the Labor Court procedure whether the employment contract has been terminated by the 
dismissal in question or not, the employee can demand under certain conditions to continue working on his or 
her job until the final decision of the Labor Court . According to section 102, paragraph 4 of the Works
Constitution Act, the dismissed employee is entitled to be reinstated during the procedure, if the works council 
has contradicted the dismissal. [65] However, the Federal Labor Court has extended this right of the dismissed 
employee to be reinstated during the Labor Court procedure to other cases. According to an important decision 
of 1985, [66] the dismissed employee can demand the provisional reinstatement if the dismissal is evidently 
unlawful or if the Labor Court of first instance declares the dismissal to be unlawful. In these cases, the 
employee's interest to continue working, constitutionally protected by the right of personality, would outweigh 
the employer's interest to terminate the employment relationship. However, it seems that the right to be 
reinstated during the Labor Court procedure does not play an important role in practice. 
D. Anti-discrimination law 
The concept of social justification is – as we have seen – the core element in the German model of dismissal
protection. Anti-discrimination law, on the contrary, traditionally possesses only a less relevant place in this
system. Of course, there are several statutory provisions in German labor law forbidding discriminatory
dismissals. The constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of association, for example, excludes dismissals on the
ground of union membership of employees. [67] Moreover, it is consented that Article 3, paragraph 3 of the
German Constitution prohibiting discriminations on the grounds of race, ethnic provenance or religion are not 
only binding on the State but have also a (certain) horizontal effect and are binding on employers as well. 
Consequently, dismissals that violate this constitutional provision are void since they are contrary to public 
policy. [68] The efficiency of this dismissal protection should not be overestimated: In spite of the horizontal 
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effect of these constitutional guarantees, anti-discrimination law has not yet played an important role in 
dismissal protection. 
Much more important for the dismissal protection is the European labor law. Section 611a, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code, established in 1980 with the intention to transpose the EC Directive 76/207 of February 9, 1976 
[69] “on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions”, forbids inter alia direct as well as 
indirect discriminatory dismissals of employers on the ground of gender. [70] However, the impact of this 
provision seems to be rather marginal. At present, the question is whether this situation is going to change 
with the new anti-discrimination Directives of the EC from 2000. The Directive 2000/78/EC of November 27, 
2000 [71] “establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation” forbids direct
and indirect discriminations on the grounds of the employee's religion, disability, age or sexual orientation and
the EU-Directive 2000/43/EC of June 29, 2000 [72] “implementing the principle of equal treatment between
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin” excludes discriminations on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin.
Both Directives also cover the termination of employment contracts. [73] Until now (October 2005), the 
German legislature has not transposed these two important European Directives into German law, [74] 
although the Directive 2000/43/EC had to be transposed until July 19, 2005 and the Directive 2000/78/EC even 
by December 2, 2003. [75] At the moment, the concrete impact of these two European Directives on the 
statutory dismissal protection remains unclear. However, it is probable that antidiscrimination law particularly 
becomes relevant for discriminations on the grounds of religious belief such as prohibitions of the Muslim 
headscarf or Muslim prayers at the workplace. [76] Since the European Directives also forbid indirect 
discriminations, the protection of religious freedom at the workplace in German labor law has to be revisited in 
the near future. 
E. Statutory and Collectively Agreed Dismissal Protection 
Dismissal protection in Germany essentially has a statutory character, the core of which builds the Act on 
Protection against Dismissal. This predominance of statutory law in the field of dismissal protection is a result 
of a deeply rooted understanding in Germany that the Welfare State has to provide a minimum dismissal 
protection for employees. [77] However, this does not mean that collective bargaining does not have any 
relevance for dismissal protection. According to section 1, paragraph 1 of the Collective Agreement Act, [78] 
norms of collective agreements can also regulate the termination of the employment contract. Consequently, 
the employer's freedom to dismiss can be subject to a collective agreement. [79] Nevertheless there is one 
important restriction: Since the provisions of the Act on Protection against Dismissals provide a statutory 
minimum for the dismissal protection, collective agreements only can modify them in favor of the employee. 
[80] 
In practice, there are a large number of collective agreements that improve the employees' protection against 
dismissal. It will suffice to name only the two most important types. The first type of collective provisions 
concern the notice period: Many collective agreements extend the statutory notice period provided by section 
622 Civil Code. [81] Much more interesting in our context are collective agreements that refer to the content of 
the employer's right to dismiss. A number of collective agreements even exclude ordinary dismissals by the 
employer for certain groups of employees. Some of them augment the protection for older employees: In the 
public sector collective agreement, for instance, employees with at least fifteen years of service cannot be 
dismissed anymore. [82] Others are included in concession agreements: These collective agreements, aiming 
at improving job security in companies that suffer serious economic difficulties, typically contain a quid pro 
quo. [83] The employees' side accepts – sometimes far-reaching – wage cuts [84] for a certain period of time
contributing to the restructuring of the company; in return, the employer normally renounces his or her right to
dismiss for economic reasons during the period of time the collective agreements remains in force
(“employment guarantee”).
IV. Dismissal Protection For Specific Groups 
Beyond this general regime of dismissal protection, based on the notion of social justification, specific groups of
employees such as disabled employees, trainees or young mothers dispose of a higher level of statutory
dismissal protection. The law considers them as “problem groups” and raises the general level of dismissal
protection in their favor. We only emphasize on the most relevant of them.
One instrument to raise the level of dismissal protection is the involvement of public authorities in the dismissal 
procedure. Disabled employees, for instance, can only be dismissed with the authorization of the so-called 
integration office. [85] The authorization is in the discretionary power of the integration office. [86] Another 
example is pregnant employees and mothers until four months after the childbirth: In principle, the employer 
cannot dismiss them, if she has knowledge of the pregnancy or the accouchement or if she receives information 
about it within two weeks after the pronouncement of the dismissal [87] . However, the competent authority of 
the State is entitled to authorize the dismissal, if the dismissal is not motivated by the pregnancy or by the 
accouchement of the employee [88] . In practice, this can lead to long administrative procedures for the 
employer. 
Another instrument is to limit the employer's freedom to dismiss not only to the cases of a social justification in 
the sense of section 1 of the Act on Protection against Dismissal, but to the legal requirements of a dismissal 
without notice [89] . Trainees, for example, only can be dismissed if there is an important reason. [90] Another 
example is members of works councils or other legally provided employee representations (e.g. the 
apprentices' representatives): An important reason is needed for them as well; [91] moreover, the works 
council has to declare its consent with the dismissal. [92] Only if the establishment is closed down can 
members of works council be dismissed with notice. [93] In the case that only a department of the 
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establishment is closed down, works council members have to be transferred to another department. [94] This 
obligation to transfer the employee is far-reaching. The employer can even be obliged to dismiss another 
employee in order to be enabled to move the works council member to another workplace. [95] By establishing 
this higher level of dismissal protection for members of works councils, the legislature wants to safeguard the 
continuity and the functioning of the workers´ representation.
V. Dispute Resolution 
The efficiency of every system of dismissal protection stands and falls with the mechanisms of dispute 
resolution that is provided by the law. In Germany , this is the jurisdiction in labor matters. 43.9 % of all files 
decided by the Labor Courts concern the termination of the employment contract. [96] It is therefore important 
to give a brief overview of the essential elements of the structure of the labor courts and the procedure to be 
followed before them in dismissal cases. 
However, it has to be noted that only a small minority of the dismissed employees, 15 %, attack their dismissal 
before the labor courts. [97] Hence, the vast majority of the dismissal cases disputes are resolved outside the
dispute resolution machinery provided by the law. For some time now, the legislature tended to promote
settlements of dismissal disputes outside the Courts. For in 2003 the legislature created a new section 1a Act
on Protection against Dismissal, according to which in cases of dismissals for economic reasons the employee is
entitled to a severance pay if he or she does not attack the dismissal before the Labor Court within three weeks
– the statutory delay for the filing of a law suit against the employer in dismissal cases [98] – and if the
employer has declared that he or she is willing to pay an indemnity. [99] However, the impact of this new 
provision should not be overestimated, since the parties already have had the right to agree upon severance 
pays before the reform of 2003. It has rather symbolic relevance. [100] 
A. The Labor Courts 
In contrast to most other countries, Germany has a specific labor jurisdiction that was established by the Labor 
Courts Act in 1926. All individual and collective labor law disputes are decided by labor courts and not by the 
ordinary courts for civil law matters. The jurisdiction in labor matters is divided into three instances: the Labor 
Courts ( Arbeitsgerichte ) on the local level, the State Labor Courts ( Landesarbeitsgerichte ) on the regional 
level, and the Federal Labor Court ( Bundesarbeitsgericht ) on the federal level. It is characterized by its
tripartite structure. In the Labor Courts of first instance, for example, the panels are composed of one career
judge, the chairperson of the panel, and two lay judges – one coming from the employers' side and the other
from the employees' side. [101] The same applies to the State Labor Courts. [102] The Senates of the Federal 
Labor Court are composed of three career judges (the chairperson and two assessors) and two lay judges. 
[103] 
In terms of costs, the labor courts are easily accessible for employees. The court fees in the labor jurisdiction 
are smaller than court fees of other jurisdictions such as the ordinary court. [104] Advance payments of the 
court fees are, contrary to other jurisdictions, excluded. [105] In procedures before the Labor Courts of first 
instance each party has to bear the costs of its own lawyer. [106] This limits the employee's cost risk resulting 
from an action before the Labor Court considerably and facilitates the access to the labor courts. Furthermore, 
there is no legal requirement for the parties to be represented by a lawyer before the courts of first instance; 
[107] only in procedures before the State Labor Courts and the Federal Labor Court there is such an obligation. 
[108] However, unionized employees are privileged, since they can be represented before the Labor Court and 
the State Labor Court by union representatives. [109] Non-unionized employees can minimize their cost risks 
by a legal insurance that covers the costs of necessary law suits. [110] For employees who do not have the
financial means to pay a lawyer honorary, section 11a, paragraph 1 of the Labor Court Act provides the
possibility of an assignment of counsel to the suing employee. As far as the Court fees are concerned,
employees can receive – as all other parties in court procedures – legal aid under certain restrictive conditions.
[111] 
B. Procedure Before the Labor Courts 
If a dismissed employee wants to legally attack the dismissal, he or she can apply for protection against 
dismissal before the labor court and has to bring the action against the employer within a delay of three weeks 
starting with the receiving of the dismissal's notification. [112] After the expiration of the delay, the dismissal is 
considered as legal. [113] Only in cases of special hardship can the court admit abelated application. [114] 
Employees, therefore have to act quickly after receiving a dismissal. 
It is important to note that the activity of the Labor Courts is not limited to jurisdiction. On the contrary, one 
essential element of the procedure before the Labor Courts is mediation. The Labor Courts Act provides in
section 54 compulsory mediation hearings in every labor dispute to be held before the audience. It shall take
place within two weeks after the commencement of the action. [115] The mediation hearing is presided by the 
chairperson of the Labor Court panel alone, i.e. by the career judge; the two lay judges are not involved in this 
stage of the procedure. The purpose of the hearing is to bring the parties to a compromise. A large number of 
dismissal cases are already settled in this early stage of the procedure. The main reason for this figure is the 
high legal uncertainty that exist in most of the dismissal cases. In order to avoid an increasing of transaction 
costs in particular employers have an economic interest to settle the conflict by paying compensation to the 
suing employee. Their willingness for a compromise can be explained by the legal effects of a Labor Court 
ruling in favor of the suing employee. If the Labor Court decided that the dismissal is illegal, the sued employer 
would have to pay the wages for the whole period of the Labor Court procedure. [116] In procedures that take 
one year, or including the second instance, even two years, the wages to be paid to the employee can grow to 
a considerable sum and can be a very high financial burden, especially for small and medium sized enterprises. 
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Although the Labor Courts Act provides explicitly that complaints against dismissals must be dealt with 
immediately, this fundamental time problem has not been resolved by the law. [117] 
Only after the failure of the mediation procedure can the regular hearing before the Labor Court take place. As
a large number of cases are settled during the mediation hearing and others are settled in the regular hearing –
sometimes the outcome of a hearing of evidence increases the willingness of one party to settle the dispute –,
only 11 % of all cases regarding the termination of the employment contract are decided by the Labor Courts.
[118] The length of the procedure in one instance depends on several aspects, particularly on the complexity of 
the case in question: If a hearing of evidence is needed, for instance, the Labor Court has to assign another 
hearing date and has to prepare it ( e.g. summoning of witnesses). Statistics about the average length of 
procedures before the Labor Courts are not available on Federal Level. [119] However, the already mentioned 
empirical study from Höland, Kahl and Zeibig [120] shows that the average length of the analyzed Labor Court 
procedures (from the filing to the last hearing before the Court) amounts to six months in the first instance; the 
same applies to the appeal procedure before the State Labor Court . But, due to budget cuts in the 
administration of justice at State-level during recent years, there are fewer career judges at the Labor Courts 
for an increasing number of files. Hence, the lengthening of procedures before the Labor Courts seems to be 
inevitable in the near future. 
As mentioned above, the main intention of the dismissal protection is to enforce the reinstatement of the 
dismissed employee and not the financial compensation of the employee for his or her lost job. Nonetheless, 
there is one important exception that plays a considerable role in practice: The Labor Court can dissolve the 
employment contract on request of the employer, if the dismissal is illegal and a further profitable cooperation 
between both parties is not to be expected. [121] It is important to note, that the facts constituting the 
expectation of a non-profitable co-operation in the future, can be created by the employer himself or herself 
during the Labor Court procedure. [122] However, the termination of the contract is not without cost since the 
employer has to pay severances to the employee. The fixation of the severance pay is left to the discretion of 
the Labor Court , within the limits defined by the law. [123] The general rule is that for each year of service the 
employer has to pay between one half and one month's remuneration. [124] Consequently, it is more or less in 
the hands of the employer to undermine the legislature's intention to protect employment relationships against 
arbitrary dismissals. 
In summary, it can be said that the activity of the Labor Court is incompletely characterized by the term 
jurisdiction. Due to the specific situation and to the interests of the parties involved in dismissal procedures, 
Labor Courts fulfill the function of mediation machinery much more than other jurisdictions. Consequently, the 
original intention of reintegration of dismissed employees is substituted to a large extent by severance pay. F 
ew of the dismissal cases brought to the Labor Courts lead to the reinstatement of the employee. 
VI. Economic Effects Of The Dismissal Protection 
The economic effects of the German system of dismissal protection are more increasingly discussed than the
last two decades. The main reason for this is the changed economic background in Germany since the late
1970s. At that time, the “economic miracle” of the post-war period found its end. Since then, the Federal
Republic of Germany has to face an increasing long term mass unemployment that has amounted to 12 % in
April 2005 [125] and therefore has won a frightening dimension. In particular, in the five new States in East
Germany – whose economy has been transformed from a centrally planned into a market economy –
unemployment is the crucial problem. It is therefore not surprising that employment promotion has gained a
privileged place in the political arena and that the question of possible (negative) effects of the Act on
Protection against Dismissals on the labor markets – particularly on the unemployment rate – has been raised.
These macro-economic effects are controversially discussed by economists and labor lawyers.
A. The Impact of Dismissal Protection on Unemployment 
Many economists and labor lawyers argue that the existing employment protection is in part responsible for the 
increasing structural unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany. [126] The high costs for the
termination of an employment contract caused by the Act on Protection against Dismissal (court fees, lawyer
expenses, severance pays etc.) would be likely to prevent employers from hiring new employees in times of
economic growth. Their possibilities to react to changed conditions on the markets by “firing” are reduced, with
the consequence that they will be more reluctant to hire employees during an upswing. To make the point: The
existing dismissal protection would protect the interests of those integrated into an employment relationship
(insiders) and would disadvantage job-seekers (outsiders) on the labor markets. [127] The labor markets 
would become ossified. [128] Following the adherents of the insider-outsider-model, the existing system of
dismissal protection has to be “deregulated” and “flexibilized”. This widespread view has not been without
effects on the German labor law legislature: One recent example is the reform of the dismissal protection in
2004 by which the threshold of the small-business-clause [129] has been raised from five to ten employees. 
[130] 
However, there is no empirical evidence for the negative impact of employment protection on the 
unemployment rate suggested by the adherents of the insider-outsider-model. The only comparative study we 
are disposing of is the OECD Employment Outlook of 1999. [131] The cross-country comparison of employment 
protection regulation refers to dismissal protection as well as regulation of temporary work. The strictness of 
the dismissal protection is measured by regular procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pays for 
no-fault individual dismissals and the difficulty of dismissal. [132] According to the country ranking, the overall 
strictness of German statutory dismissal protection amounts to 2.8 in the late 1990s, which is corresponding to 
place twenty-first out of 26 countries in toto . [133] Hence, the German dismissal protection belongs to the 
stricter models and is only surpassed by Sweden (2.8), Italy (2.8), the Czech Republic (2.8), the Netherlands 
Wrongful Dismissals In The Federal Republic Of Germany ( IUSLabor... http://www.upf.edu/iuslabor/042005/Artic01.htm
9 de 16 27/04/2007 16:29
(3.1), Korea (3.2) and Portugal (4.3). [134] As one important conclusion, the study suggests that strictness of 
employment protection regulation has little or no effect on the unemployment rate. [135] However, the level of
employment protection can influence the demographic composition of unemployment: In countries with strict
employment protection regulation, the unemployment of prime-age men as the “normal employees” will be
lower whereas the unemployment of specific labor market groups such as younger workers, will be higher.
Furthermore, “a strict employment protection is associated with lower flows into and out of unemployment and
longer durations of unemployment”. [136] In general, the results of the OECD study have been confirmed by a 
recent study effectuated for the European Commission. [137] 
Also a recent within-country study by the Institute for Economic and Social Research of the
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung [138] has confirmed these findings. The study shows that the threshold of the small 
business clause does not have any significant (negative) impact on job creation [139] . The most relevant 
criterion for employers to hire is the economic situation. 
B. Some Other Economic Effects 
The strict dismissal protection in Germany also can have other (positive) economic effects that shall only be 
pointed out briefly in this context. Some economists argue that employers react to the statutory limitations of 
their freedom to terminate the employment relationship by rationalizing their recruitment procedures. [140] 
Hence, the anticipation of possible dismissal costs favors the development of a rational personnel policy in 
companies covered by the Act on Protection against Dismissal and can positively influence the productivity of 
the firm. Another possible effect of the statutory dismissal protection on the firm's productivity is that it favors 
the existence of long-term employment relationships and by this can increase the willingness of employees to 
acquire firm-specific know-how. [141] However, there is no empirical evidence about the concrete relevance of 
these economic effects resulting from dismissal protection. 
 
VII. Reform Proposals 
The critics of the Act on Protection against Dismissal favor a “deregulation” of the existing regime. By
“flexibilizing” the labor markets, they essentially intend to promote job creation. [142] There is a great number
of reform proposals “on the market”. We only emphasize two types of reform proposals that seem to be the
most relevant in the ongoing discussion.
A. Severance Pays Instead of Reinstatement 
The most far-reaching proposals demand a paradigm shift in the existing system of dismissal protection. One 
step in this direction has been the above mentioned establishment of section 1a of the Act on Protection against 
Dismissal. Following this group of proposals, the main function of the Act on Protection against Dismissal, the 
maintenance of existing employment relationships, shall be substituted by a financial compensation of the 
dismissed employee. Instead of the reinstatement, the employee shall be entitled only to a severance pay. 
[143] The proposed models differ considerably. Buchner, [144] for example, suggests a radical reform of the 
existing system: According to him, the employer should be obliged to pay a compensation for every dismissal. 
Others want to exclude dismissals for economic reasons from a paradigm shift. [145] And finally, Hanau wants 
to give to the employee the choice between the reinstatement or a severance pay if a dismissal for economic 
reasons or for reasons concerning the employee's personality is socially unjustified. [146] 
However, there are serious doubts whether or not the intended cost reductions for employers can be realized 
by a compensation model. Following the empirical study of the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung on the Regulation on the
Labor Market (REGAM), only a small minority of all dismissed employees (15 %) receive severance pays. [147] 
If this is true, it has to be feared that more employees than before demand severance pays in the case of a 
statutory compensation duty for the employer. Consequently, the employers' costs of the dismissal protection, 
contrary to the intention of the adherents of a compensation model, probably tend to increase these costs. 
[148] Furthermore, all reform proposals do not resolve the (implicit) problem of the costs caused by the Labor 
Court procedures in dismissal cases. Since most of the compensation models also differentiate between socially 
justified and unjustified dismissals, [149] there will be an incentive for dismissed employees to go to the Labor 
Courts. 
Finally, there is a more fundamental objection. The adherents of compensation models insinuate that dismissal 
protection is nothing more than an instrument to alleviate financial disadvantages caused by a job loss. They 
underestimate the fact that it is also a core element of our labor law to compensate the employee's economic 
and social dependence within the employment relationship. [150] The protection against arbitrary dismissals 
strengthens the employee's freedom to refuse unfair working conditions without having to fear that the 
employer will punish the refusal with a dismissal. However, it can be doubted whether the proposed 
compensation models are able to fulfill this function of the dismissal protection: Only high severance pays could 
realize this function. Since severance pays essentially depend on the tenure, it is questionable whether a 
compensation model could protect employees with a short length of service against arbitrary dismissals. 
B. Extension of the Small Business Clause 
Another important element of the reform debate is the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises. They 
are considered to be a major source of economic growth and of employment promotion and shall therefore be 
relieved financially. Consequently, the extension of the threshold of the small business clause in section 23, 
paragraph 1 of the Act on Protection against Dismissal from ten to twenty [151] or even to eighty employees 
[152] is proposed by some. It is obvious, that such a reform would lead to a considerable reduction of the 
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scope of the statutory dismissal protection. 
However, there are two major arguments against an extension of the small-business-clause. First, there are 
high constitutional risks. The Federal Constitutional Court has stated in its above-mentioned ruling from 
January 27, 1998, [153] that the reduction of dismissal protection in small business establishments only is 
justified, if it compensates specific disadvantages of these businesses, such as the personal relationship 
between employees and employer or specific cost risks of small establishments. In a second decision of the 
same date, [154] the Court denied these specificities in establishments with about fifty part-time employees. It
therefore has to be doubted whether the Court would tolerate a threshold of 20 employees – calculated pro rata 
temporis . Furthermore, the positive effects of an extension of the threshold on the labor markets are more
than unclear. There is no empirical evidence so far that a “deregulation” of the dismissal protection in small
businesses tends to promote job creation. [155] A reform of the small-business clause in the proposed sense 
therefore is problematic. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
In theory, the German model of dismissal protection aims at reinstating wrongfully dismissed employees on 
their former workplace. However, this aim is not realized in most of the dismissal cases coming before the 
Labor Courts. Only a small minority of dismissed employees is reinstated on their former job after the Labor 
Courts have decided that the dismissal was wrongful. Instead, many of them receive severance pays. As we 
have seen, this practice mainly is attributed to the high legal uncertainty, the statutory dismissal protection is 
producing for employers as well as for employees and for the duration of the Labor Court procedures that 
increases the willingness on both sides to settle the dispute. Moreover, the argument is widespread that the 
strict dismissal protection in Germany tends to augment the unemployment rate. 
The reform debate that has been enhanced by this practice and by the criticisms mainly refers to the small
business clause and to the establishing of a compensation model. By this, the critics of the existing dismissal
protection want to reduce costs and to promote job creation, in particular in small and medium-sized
enterprises. However, as we have pointed out, there is no empirical evidence for the assumption that a strict
dismissal protection causes unemployment. A total change of the system, in particular a paradigm shift to a
compensation model or a radical “deregulation” of the dismissal protection (e.g., the small business clause),
therefore, is not likely to realize the suggested cost reductions for employers and the insinuated positive impact
on the labor markets. However, the legal uncertainty that is characterizing the existing system should be
considerably reduced: Elements of such a reform could be a clarification of the rules on the “social selection” or
a concretization of the principle of proportionality.
As far as the political prospects of the German statutory dismissal protection for the near future are concerned,
the federal elections of September 18, 2005 haven't clarified the situation. At the moment (October 22, 2005) a
so-called “grand coalition” ( große Koalition ) between Christian-democrats (CDU/CSU) and the
Social-democrats (SPD) seems probable. Although the Christian-democrats have favored a “deregularization” of
the Act on the Protection against Dismissal in their campaign manifesto, it has to be doubted whether they will
be strong enough to put these reforms on the agenda of a new federal government.
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